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I. Introduction 
The study of academic labor markets by economists goes back at least to Adam 
Smith’s suggestion in The Wealth of Nations that a professor’s compensation be tied to 
the number of students that enrolled in his classes.1  This paper focuses on three academic 
labor market issues that students at Cornell and I are currently addressing; the declining 
salaries of faculty employed at public colleges and universities relative to the salaries of 
their counterparts employed at private higher education institutions, the growing 
dispersion of average faculty salaries across academic institutions within both the public 
and private sectors, and the impacts of the growing importance and costs of science on 
the academic labor market and universities. To introduce these topics, I first briefly 
survey the reawakening of economists’ interest in academic labor markets, which lay 
dormant for almost two centuries after Smith. 
 Projections of future shortages of faculty in the United States made during the 1970s 
led to a revival of scholarly interest in the academic labor market and, more specifically, 
in the determinants of the number of PhDs granted by American universities.2  In a series 
of important papers and books written in the 1970s, Richard Freeman developed cobweb 
models of the supply of professionals and his models subsequently were extended by 
others to incorporate various assumptions about the role of cohort size and expectations 
about the future time path of professionals’ salaries.3  
                                                 
1 Adam Smith (1976), p. 282-284. These pages are from Book V, chapter 1, Part III, Article II “Of the 
Expense of Education of Youth” 
2 Allan M. Cartter (1976) 
3 See for example, Richard Freeman (1971, 1975), David Stapleton (1989), Dennis L. Hoffman and Stuart 
A. Low (1983) and Aloysius Siow (1984). 
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To adequately model the supply side of the academic labor market requires much 
more complicated models. One needs to consider the determinants of undergraduates’ 
choice of majors, the determinants of the flows of college graduates to PhD study from 
different majors both directly after graduation and with a delay, the determinants of PhD 
students’ time to degree and completion rates, the changing role and lengths of 
postdoctoral appointments, the decision by new PhDs to accept academic employment 
rather than nonacademic employment, the flows of PhDs from the academic to the 
nonacademic sectors and vice versa and the retirement behavior of faculty. While 
research has been conducted on many of these topics during the last 30 years, our 
knowledge about many of them remains very imprecise.4 
What is also imprecise is our knowledge of the determinants of the supply of foreign 
students to PhD study and the role of foreign PhDs in the academic labor market. When I 
received my PhD degree in 1970 only about 11.4% of all new PhDs and 18.6% of new 
PhDs in economics granted by American universities went to foreign students (students 
on temporary visas); in 2000 the comparable figures were 28.9% and 49.4%.5 Foreign 
students make up an even larger share of new PhDs in some science and engineering 
fields and they and their countrymen who received their PhDs outside of the United 
States also make up a large share of all postdoctoral fellows working on biomedical 
research in the United States.6 Foreign residents’ ability to enter the country for study, let 
alone to stay and work in the United States either temporarily or permanently, depends 
                                                 
4. Much of the research though the early 1990s on these topics is summarized in Ronald G. Ehrenberg  
(1991, 1992). Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Panagiotis G. Mavros (1995) study the determents of time-to-
degree and completion rates.  
5 These figures come from WebCaspar 
6 National Research Council (1998) 
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upon both employment opportunities in the United States and other nations and our 
immigration policies. 
 While concern has been expressed by some that the growth of foreign PhD students 
has been at the expense of underrepresented minority groups in the United States, the one 
study that examined this subject found that the best U.S PhD programs tend to 
discriminate against foreign students and in favor of under represented minority students 
in their admissions process.7 That is, holding measures of applicant quality such as GRE 
scores constant, foreign students were less likely to be admitted to these programs and 
under represented minority students more likely to be admitted, than other U.S. citizen 
applicants.  
The late 1980s saw the publication of an important book by William Bowen and Julie 
Ann Sosa that focused on demand side of the academic labor market and presented 
projections of a forthcoming shortage of faculty in Arts and Science disciplines.8  A 
critique of the Bowen and Sosa book that I published in 1991, pointed out that their 
projections were based on a number of strict assumptions, the relaxation of any one of 
which could substantially alter their results.9 One key assumption was that the 
student/tenure track doctorate faculty ratio, which had declined during the 1980s, would 
not increase in the future. Instead, during the 1990s, American institutions of higher 
education increased their reliance on part-time and adjunct faculty and this, along with 
tremendous inflows of foreign graduate students, kept the market for new faculty in 
balance. For example, between 1987 and 1998, the proportion of faculty members 
                                                 
7 Gregory Attiyeh and Richard Attiyeh (1997) 
8 William G. Bowen and Julie Ann Sosa (1989) 
9 Ronald G. Ehrenberg (1991). See National Research Council (2000) for a more recent critique of 
projection models of the demand for doctoral scientists and engineers. 
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employed part-time in the United States rose from 33 to 42 percent.10 As a result, real 
salaries of faculty did not increase substantially during the 1990s, which one might have 
expected to observe if shortages of new PhDs were materializing. 
Why has the use of part-time and nontenure track faculty grown so rapidly in the 
United States? This growth flies in the face of models of prestige maximizing academic 
institutions employed by a number of economists to explain the “arms race of spending” 
that is taking place in selective private higher education.11 A major reason for the 
growing use of part-time and nontenure track faculty is that the ability of a large fraction 
of American higher education institutions to generate the revenues necessary to pay for 
higher salaries for tenure track faculty is greatly limited. 
 The vast majority of American college and university students attend public higher 
education institutions and thus the vast majority of American professors are employed in 
these institutions. State appropriations to their public higher education institutions have 
not kept up with expenditure per student growth in private higher education during recent 
decades because of several recessions, because of the increased priority being placed on 
other uses of state tax revenues (such as elementary and secondary education, health, 
welfare, and criminal justice) and because of the pressure to reduce, rather than increase, 
state income and sales tax rates. In addition, in many states governors and state 
legislatures firmly are committed to the belief that in-state tuition should be kept low, 
which limits another major source of revenue for public higher education institutions. 
As a result, the salaries of faculty in public higher education institutions have 
declined relative to the salaries of faculty in private higher education institutions over the 
                                                 
10 Robin Wilson (2001) 
11 See, for example, Gordon Winston (1999) and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2000) 
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last two decades. For example, in the fall of 1978, the average salary of professors at 
public research and doctorate granting institutions was 91 percent of the average salary of 
professors at private research and doctorate granting institutions. By 1993, this ratio had 
fallen to 79% and it has hovered around that level ever since.   
 The declining public/private academic salary ratio in the United States is well known 
and has been discussed in several places.12 What is less recognized is that within both the 
public and private academic labor market sectors, an increase in the dispersion of average 
faculty salaries across universities has also taken place. As figure 1 indicates, the 
variance of the logarithm of average real full professor salaries across universities 
increased between 1978 and 2001 in both the public and private sectors and similar trends 
have been observed for associate professor (figure 2) and assistant professor (figure 3) 
salaries. Moreover, the increasing dispersion of faculty salaries across academic 
institutions is not confined to the major research universities. As figure 4 indicates, the 
variance across institutions in the logarithm of average real faculty salaries increased 
between 1973 and 1998 at all ranks in private liberal arts colleges as well. 
II. Changing Public/Private Faculty Salary Differentials  
The forces behind the decline in the average salaries of professors in public 
universities relative to the average salaries of professors in private universities are easy to 
identify. The weighted average real state appropriation per FTE student at public research 
universities remained roughly constant between 1985 and 199713. While some publics 
                                                 
12 See for example, F. King Alexander (2001), Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2000), chapter 2, Linda Bell (2000), 
Daniel Hamermesh (2002) and Cindy Zoghi  (forthcoming) 
13 The statistics that follow come in large part from the NSF WEBCASPAR system. Weighted average real 
state appropriations per student actually declined between 1988 and 1993 and then rose in real terms 
between 1993 and 1998. It is this latter increase that partially explains why the average salaries of 
professors at public research universities did not decline relative to their private counterparts’ salaries after 
1993. 
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sought to increase their tuition levels at percentage rates that exceeded the percentage 
rates of increase of private tuitions, they were starting from a much lower absolute level 
and thus their real tuition level per student increased in absolute terms less than did the 
real tuition levels of their private counterparts. Not surprisingly then, the real expenditure 
per FTE student gap between public and private research and doctoral institutions has 
widened considerably since 1979. 
In work in progress, Andrew Nutting and I have estimated logarithm of average 
salary equations, by rank, separately for public and private institutions using panel data 
that span the 1973-1998 period. Our models include as explanatory variables endowment 
per student, tuition (in-state tuition for the publics) and state appropriations per student, 
as well as institutional fixed effects. We find that between 50% and 60% of the change in 
the ratio of average public to average private professor salary at each rank between 1973 
and 1998 can be explained by differences in the change in real tuition levels in the two 
sectors. The preoccupation with percentage rates of growth of tuition has led observers to 
forget that unless state appropriations per student increase at a rate of 2 to 3 percent a 
year above the rate of inflation, which is the rate at which historically private tuition 
growth has exceeded inflation, public tuition increases that are less in dollar terms than 
private tuition increases almost guarantee that faculty salaries at public higher education 
institutions will fall further behind those of their counterparts employed at private 
institutions.14 
                                                 
14 William Bowen (1965) showed that tuition levels at a set of major private research universities outpaced 
the rate of inflation by an average of 2 to 3 percent a year for the first two-thirds of the 20th century and 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2000), chapter 1, presents evidence that the trend continued during the last third of 
the century. 
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The decline in the ratio of public university professors’ salaries relative to private 
university professors’ salaries surely makes it more difficult for public universities to hire 
and retain top faculty, especially at the senior level.15 Anecdotal stories abound about 
public universities being raided by privates for their young tenured faculty members. In 
one recent year the University of Arizona, whose average faculty salaries at each rank 
was about at the mean of the average salaries across all public research and doctoral 
universities, lost 75 faculty members to other institutions in spite of the efforts it made to 
retain them with counter offers.16 
 National data on the turnover rates of tenured faculty is not readily available. 
However, each year the American Association of University Professors collects, as part 
of its survey of academic salaries, institutional level data on the numbers of full-time 
faculty in each rank in the previous year, that the institution also employs in the current 
year, regardless of what their ranks are in the current year.17 Subject to some 
qualification, this permits one to compute a continuation rate for faculty members in each 
rank in each institution.18 The continuation rate, or more precisely one minus the 
continuation rate, for assistant professors cannot be used as a measure of voluntary 
turnover as some assistant professors leaving an institution may do so because they are 
                                                 
15  Dan Hamermesh informed me that in preliminary work he found no evidence that the increasing salary 
gap between public and private research universities led to a systematic decline in the number of public 
institutions ranked among the top 5 or 10 in the arts and science and engineering fields between the 1980s 
and 1990s National Research Council studies of faculty quality. However, when Nutting and I regressed the 
change in an economics department’s NRC faculty quality rating between the 1980s and 1990s on its 1980s 
faculty quality rating and the percentage change in average full professor salary at the institution between 
1982 and 1993, we found for institutions ranked in the top half of economics PhD programs in the 1980s, 
that higher salary growth was associated with a greater increase in the faculty quality rating. 
16 Scott Smallwood (2001)  
17 This means, for example, that faculty members who are associate professors in one year who are 
promoted to full professor in the second year are counted as continuing associate professors in the second 
year. 
18 These qualifications relate to the treatment of faculty who are serving as administrators or who are on 
leave in either the current or previous year. 
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involuntarily leaving because they have been denied tenure. The continuation rate for 
professors is “contaminated” by faculty departures due to retirement, disability and death. 
The continuation rate of associate professors, most of whom are tenured faculty, comes 
closest to approximating a voluntary retention rate.  
When Hirsch Kasper, Dan Rees and I used the AAUP continuation rate data for the 
1988-89 academic year we found that, other factors held constant, institutions with higher 
continuation rates tended to have higher average faculty salaries than their competitors. 
Moreover, the magnitude of this relationship was largest for research and doctoral 
institutions.19  So given the falling ratio of the average salary of professors at public 
research and doctoral universities to the average salary of professors at private research 
and doctoral universities that had taken place by the early 1990s, it is reasonable to 
expect that the private institutions would have lower voluntary turnover rates and thus 
higher associate professor continuation rates than their public university counterparts 
during the decade of the 1990s. 
 The AAUP has provided Matthew Nagowski and me with institutional level data that 
has permitted us to compute continuation rates annually for associate professors at 
research and doctoral institutions during the decade of the 1990s. The weighted (by 
faculty size) and unweighted average continuation rates for a set of institutions that were 
in the sample in each year appear in figure 5. It is not surprising, given the gap between 
average salaries in the two sectors, that the average continuation rate for associate 
professors at private research and doctoral institutions did exceed the average 
                                                 
19 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Hirschell Kasper and Daniel I. Rees (1991) 
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continuation rate for associate professors at public research and doctoral institutions in 
every year.20 
III. The Growing Dispersion in Average Faculty Salaries 
The causes of the growing dispersion in the logarithm of average faculty salaries 
across institutions differ for private and public institutions. Our models attribute the vast 
majority of the growing dispersion across private institutions to the growing dispersion of 
endowment wealth. To understand why this is true, it is important to realize that even if 
two institutions experience the same percent increase in endowment per student during a 
period of time, the institution that has the highest initial level of endowment per student 
will gain more absolutely in endowment per student than the institution with the lower 
initial level of endowment per student.21 If other sources of institutional income, such as 
tuition per student are not growing at rates that are as high in percentage terms as the rate 
at which endowment per student is growing, the institution with the larger initial 
endowment per student will see its total income per student growing by a greater 
percentage than its relatively poorer counterpart. Thus, it will be able to increase its 
average faculty salary level by a greater percentage during the period. 
 To illustrate why this is true, table 1 presents data relevant to the experience of 
two institutions, Princeton and Cornell, during the decade of the 1990s.22  For simplicity, 
                                                 
20 The associate professor rank is not a tenured rank at some private research institutions and thus some 
departures of associate professors at the privates are involuntary. This strengthens the conclusion that 
voluntary turnover is higher at the public institutions. 
21 See Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Christopher L. Smith (2001) for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
22 Cornell is a very complex institution.  Three of its undergraduate colleges, the statutory colleges, receive 
financial support from New York State and in return, charge students from New York State much lower 
tuition levels. Faculty in these colleges have considerably lower average salaries than the average salaries 
of faculty in Cornell’s endowed, or private colleges and it is the latter’s average salaries that are used in the 
comparisons below. Finally, a substantial share of Cornell’s endowment is “owned” by its medical college, 
which is located in New York City and these assets cannot be used to finance faculty salaries on the Ithaca 
campus. If I had subtracted the endowments owned Cornell’s medical and statutory colleges, the Cornell 
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I assume in this table that the only sources of income to support faculty salaries are 
tuition revenues and spending from endowment.23  Princeton, which has the largest 
endowment per student in the nation, saw its endowment per student grow from roughly 
$390,000 on July 1,1990 to about $1,323,000 on July 1, 2000, an increase of about 240%. 
During the same period of time, Cornell’s endowment per student grew from about 
$51,000 to $186,000 an increase of over 260%. So Cornell actually experienced a greater 
percentage rate of growth of its endowment per student during the period.   
 Most academic institutions aim to spend roughly 5% of the value of their 
endowment, averaged over a number of years, each year on current operations.24 To keep 
things simple, I further assume that during each academic year Cornell and Princeton 
each spent 5% of the value of its endowment as of July 1 of the year.  With this 
assumption, Princeton’s endowment would have provided the institution with $19,500 to 
spend per student in 1990-91 and $66,150 per student to spend in 2000-2001, an increase 
of about $46,650 per student over the decade. In contrast, Cornell’s endowment would 
have provided it with spending of $2,550 per student in 1990-91 and $9,300 per student 
in 2000-2001, an increase of $6,750 over the decade. In spite of the fact that Cornell’s 
endowment per student increased by a greater percentage than Princeton’s during the 
decade, Cornell fell further behind Princeton in terms of the absolute number of dollars it 
had available to spend per student each year from its endowment.  
 Why this is important is that the level of the other source of revenue, tuition 
revenue per student, was initially very similar at the two institutions and then grew at 
                                                                                                                                                 
endowment per student figures would be about 20 percent larger in both 1990 and 2000, but the increase 
would not be large enough to substantially alter my conclusions. 
23 I am ignoring other sources of revenue such as annual giving and research funding but these omissions 
do not change my argument in any way.  
24 Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2000), chapter 3, provides a discussion of why this is true 
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roughly the same rate during the decade; a rate that was much smaller than the rate of 
endowment growth. Cornell’ s tuition grew from $15,164 to $24,852, an increase of 64%. 
Princeton’s tuition grew from $15,440 to $25,430, an increase of 65%. Because 
Princeton’s spending from endowment comprised a much greater share of its spending in 
1990-91 than did Cornell’s and tuition at both institutions grew at a much slower rate 
than endowment wealth did during the decade, the net result of these changes was that 
Princeton’s total spending per student grew by 162% during the decade, while Cornell’s 
“only” grew by 93%.  
 In this simple example, Princeton’s total spending per student was 1.97 times 
Cornell’s total spending per student in 1990-91. By 2000-2001, this ratio had increased to 
2.68.  You thus should not be surprised to learn that while the average salary of full 
professors at Princeton was 15% higher than the average salary of full professors at 
Cornell in 1990-91, by 2000-2001 Princeton’s relative salary advantage had grown to 
22%. 25 
 More generally, Nutting and my estimates suggest that at the professor, associate 
and assistant professor levels about 75%, 90% and 95%, respectively, of the increases in 
the variance of the logarithms of average real faculty salaries across private research 
universities that are displayed in figures 1 to 3 can be explained by the growing 
inequality of endowment wealth across the private research universities during the period.  
For the private liberal arts colleges, the comparable percentages of the increases in the 
                                                 
25 One might reasonably ask why the relative salary advantage of Princeton’s faculty did not grow still 
more. The answer undoubtedly is that Princeton also used the increases in the spending that its endowment 
was generating for other purposes such as improving its undergraduate students financial aid packages, 
increasing the size of its graduate student stipends, reducing (relative to Cornell) its student/faculty ratio, 
improving the funding of its athletic programs and, in the future, will increase the size of its undergraduate 
student body and expand its graduate programs. 
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variances of the logarithm of average faculty salaries displayed in figure 4 that can by 
explained by the growing inequality of endowment wealth are 95%, 100% and 81% for 
the three ranks.  
 Our models suggest that for public research universities the growing variance in 
the logarithms of average real salaries is due both to growing endowment per student 
differences and growing differences in state appropriations per student.  However for all 
three ranks changes in endowment per student play at best a minor role, never explaining 
more than 30% of the growing dispersion in the logarithm of average real faculty salaries. 
Most of the increase in the variances of the logarithm of average real faculty salaries 
across research institutions is due to growing differences in state appropriations per 
student across these institutions. Indeed, for assistant and associate professors, virtually 
all of the increase in the variances in the logarithm of faculty salaries is due to this factor. 
 The increased dispersion of average faculty salaries across institution in both the 
public and private sectors suggests that it is becoming increasingly difficult for some 
institutions to attract and retain high quality faculty. To the extent that faculty quality 
now differs more across institutions, where students go to college is likely to matter even 
more in the future than it has in the past.26  
IV. The Growing Importance and Cost of Science 
Scientific research has come to dominate many major American university campuses 
and this is reflected in the way that universities are ranked. U.S News & World Report’s 
annual ranking of national universities as undergraduate institutions places heavy weight 
                                                 
26 See Dominic J. Brewer, Eric R. Eide and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (1999) and Eric R. Eide, Dominic J. 
Brewer and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (1998) 
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on the volume of external research funding that faculty members at universities receive.27 
The 1994 Carnegie Foundation classification of PhD granting institutions into Research I, 
Research II, Doctoral I and Doctoral II institutions was similarly heavily based on the 
institutions’ volumes of external research funding and institutions strove mightily to 
increase their funding to receive a higher classification in the next Carnegie classification 
revision.28 Concerned that this behavior was causing universities to place too much 
weight on the volume of their faculty members’ external research and not enough weight 
on the quality of their graduate programs, the foundation collapsed its four PhD 
categories into two in 2000 and based an institution’s new classification solely on the 
number of PhDs that the institution produced each year.29 
Viewed in terms of 1998 dollars, the weighted (by faculty size) average volume of 
total research and development expenditures per faculty member across 228 American 
research and doctoral institutions doubled from roughly $70 thousand dollars per faculty 
member in 1971 to about $140 thousand dollars per faculty member in 1998.30 This 
growth in scientific research, which was driven by the availability of government, 
corporation and foundation funding, does not derive primarily from the various ranking 
and classification schemes, but rather derives from the major advances being made in 
science and the importance of these advances to our society. To take an example, recent 
advances in decoding the human genome, in advanced materials, and in information 
sciences promise major advances in health care treatments in the years ahead. Any 
university worth its salt wants to be a leader in these fields so that it can attract top 
                                                 
27 U.S News & World Report (2001) 
28 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1994) 
29 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (2001) 
30 The figures that follow are all computed from the NSF WEBCASPAR system 
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faculty, undergraduates and graduate students, as well as increased funding for its 
programs. 
What many people do not recognize, however, is that in spite of generous external 
support for research, increasingly the costs of research are being borne by the universities 
themselves. During the same period of time, the weighted average institutional 
expenditures on research per faculty member at these institutions more than tripled. As a 
result, the weighted average percentage of total research expenditures per faculty member 
coming from institutional funds rose from about 11 to 20 percent. Increasingly academic 
institutions are bearing a greater share of the ever-increasing costs of scientific research. 
As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, there are a number of forces that have led the 
costs of research borne by universities to soar over the past three decades.31  Theoretical 
scientists, who in a previous generation required only desks and paper and pencil, now 
often require access to supercomputers. Experimental scientists increasingly rely on 
sophisticated laboratory facilities that are expensive to build and operate.  Research 
administration now includes strict monitoring of financial records and environmental 
safety, as well as the detailed review and monitoring of experiments involving human 
subjects. 
Historically the federal government and other external funders through their provision 
of indirect cost recoveries have funded much of the costs of the research infrastructure 
that universities operate, as well as their research administration costs. Each institution 
was allowed to “mark-up” the direct cost that its faculty members requested of external 
funders for their research funding by a multiple called the indirect cost rate and the 
                                                 
31 Ronald Ehrenberg (2000), chapter 6 
 14
indirect cost revenues received on successful grant applications went to support the 
institution’s research administration and infrastructure costs. 
As panel A of figure 6 indicates, the average indirect cost rate across the 228 research 
and doctorate institutions was about 50% in 1983 and this rose to about 51.5% in 1989. 
Then, in a well-publicized case involving Stanford University in the early 1990s, 
government auditors alleged that items some expenditures included in Stanford’s indirect 
costs were not legitimately related to research and that Stanford had overcharged the 
federal government for these costs by as much as $200 million to $400 million over a ten-
year period.32 The two-parties ultimately agreed to settle the dispute by Stanford’s 
repaying $1.5 million to the government and without its making any admission of wrong 
doing. However, the damage had been done, auditors began to take a much harder look at 
universities’ requests for indirect cost recoveries and put caps on the percentages that 
institutions could claim for expenses in the various categories. As result the average 
indirect cost rate fell to about 49.5 percent in 1997. 
Averages can be misleading, however, because as panel B of figure 6 indicates, in 
1983 the average indirect cost rate at private research and doctoral universities was over 
60 percent, while the average at public research and doctoral universities was about 45 
percent.33 By 1997 the average private indirect cost rate had fallen to about 55 percent 
                                                 
32  See Donald Kennedy (1997), p. 164- 175 for an insider’s view of this incident. 
33 The lower average indirect cost rate for public universities does not imply that they spend less on 
research administration and infrastructure than their private counterparts. Rather, much of the funding they 
receive for infrastructure comes from their states in the form of financial support for buildings and the 
states usually do not require their universities to recoup these costs and return them to the state government. 
Since faculty believe that high indirect cost rates result in a reduction in their probability of winning grants 
and/or a reduction in the amount of direct costs that they can apply for, they put pressure on public 
university administrators to keep their indirect cost rates low. The administrators have obliged but, as state 
support became tighter in the 1990s, many publics allowed their indirect cost rates to float up a bit. 
Interestingly, the only study of the effect that indirect cost rates have on the size of direct cost awards and 
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while the average public indirect cost rate had risen slightly. So the decline in indirect 
cost rates was felt primarily by the private research universities and on average, for any 
given level of direct cost research funding that their faculty members received, they 
received about 8.3 percent less funds from the federal government to support their 
research infrastructure and administration in 1997 than they did in 1983. 
 What is the likely response of an institution faced with such a reduction in 
external support for research infrastructure and administration? On the one hand, it might 
try to reduce its expenditure in these areas to match the decline in the external support it 
was receiving. But such a strategy would alienate its faculty, who would see the 
institution’s commitment to research declining.34 In addition, if reductions were made in 
areas in which the institution was not spending more than the maximum that the federal 
government permitted it to charge, the federal auditors would respond by further reducing 
its indirect cost rate in the next year. Hence the university would get a double whammy, 
irate faculty and still lower indirect cost revenue the next year. So invariably 
administrators made up the reduction in external funding for research administration and 
infrastructure out of institutional funds. 
 The reduction in indirect cost rates for external research has been matched in 
recent years by increasing pressure on institutions to provide “matching” institutional 
funds for any research proposals that they submit. Put another way, to compete for 
external funding increasingly institutions had to bear a share of the direct costs of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
the probability of winning an award, Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Jaroslava K. Mykula (1999) found no 
evidence that faculty members’ perceptions about the adverse effects of high indirect rates is correct. 
34  Picture a Cornell provost contemplating the length of his future tenure in office if he announced to the 
faculty that he was going to reduce the budget of the library by $3.5 million dollars because the federal 
government had reduced the support that it had provide for the library budget by that amount (which it did 
one year). 
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faculty members’ research out of their own pockets. This further increased institutional 
costs for research. 
 Finally, as scientists’ equipment became more expensive and the competition for 
top-quality young scientists intensified, the start-up funds that universities needed to 
provide to attract young scientists and engineers increased by the late 1990s it was not 
unusual to find universities providing $500,000 to $1,000,000 of funding to young 
scientists to help them set up their laboratories. The costs of attracting distinguished 
senior scientists were even larger.  
 How have universities responded to the increasing importance and costs of 
science? One might expect that the growing importance of science has provided an 
incentive for universities to allocate a greater share of their faculty positions or faculty 
salary dollars to scientists. However, using data from a set of liberal arts colleges at 
leading private research universities, a study that Julia Epifantseva and I conducted 
found, on balance, that over a recent 20-year period neither the share of faculty positions 
nor the share of the faculty salary budget devoted to the sciences in these research 
universities’ liberal arts colleges had systematically increased during the period.35 
Controlling for the growth of enrollments in the various disciplines or for whether overall 
faculty size was increasing or decreasing did not alter these conclusions. 
 Of course it may well be that the increasing costs of science are felt throughout a 
university’s budget. To the extent that more funds from annual giving and endowment 
income are directed towards support of the scientific infrastructure, it may put upward 
pressure on undergraduate tuitions or cause cut backs in other areas. Since the faculty 
salary bill represents a large chunk of institutional costs, it is possible that the increased 
                                                 
35 Ronald G Ehrenberg and Julia Epifantseva (2001) 
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costs of science are distributed throughout the university in the form of slower rates of 
increase of faculty salaries and/or slower rates of growth of faculty employment than 
would other wise be the case, all other factors held constant. 
 In research in progress, Michael Rizzo and I have tried to test for the effects of the 
increased costs of science on faculty salary and employment levels using panel data and 
models similar to those discussed earlier. Using 22 years of data and a panel of 228 
research and doctoral institutions we estimate whether the average faculty salary level at 
an institution or its student/full-time faculty ratio is related to the level of its research 
expenditures per faculty member out of institutional funds, after one controls for 
institutional and year fixed effects, endowment per student, annual giving per student, 
undergraduate tuition levels, state appropriations per student and enrollment. While we 
find no evidence that more rapidly increasing institutional research expenditures are 
associated with slower growth rates in average faculty salaries, we do find strong 
evidence that they are associated with increases in the institutions’ student/full-time 
faculty ratio.36 On average, holding all other factors constant, an increase in institutional 
research expenditures of $10,000 per faculty/ member (in real terms) is associated with 
an increased student/faculty ratio of close to one. Moreover the magnitude of this 
relationship is larger at the private research universities, where indirect cost rates declines 
have occurred.37 
 Of course reducing the total number of faculty salary across all fields may not be 
the only route via which the increased costs and importance of science are felt at 
                                                 
36 Our faculty salary results are very preliminary because we have yet to solve the endogenity problem 
posed by faculty salary levels being a major determinant of research costs. 
37 Our estimates suggest then, that undergraduate tuition dollars are increasingly being used to subsidize 
research in the sense that higher student/full-time faculty ratios imply fewer courses offered, larger class 
sizes, more use of teaching assistants, and/or more use of adjunct and other part-time faculty. 
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universities. It is possible that in spite of the increased demand for teaching placed on 
colleges of arts and sciences at these institutions, as professional programs require more 
and more liberal arts courses, that the share of faculty positions in major private research 
universities going to colleges of arts and sciences has declined over time, as the shares 
going to more colleges that are much more heavily oriented towards scientific research, 
such as engineering and medicine, have increased. This conjecture cannot be tested in a 
straightforward manner because external research funding provides the support for a 
large fraction of faculty positions in some universities in engineering and medical 
colleges. 
 The growth of science may have crowded out things other than faculty at 
universities. For example, increased institutional provision of research assistants for the 
scientists may have led to the decreased availability of internal funds to support teaching 
assistants in the humanities or social sciences. Or increased institutional support for 
scientific research facilities and start-up costs for scientists may have reduced the funding 
that otherwise would have been available for travel and other “perks” in the humanities 
and the social sciences. Research on the impact of science on the university is clearly still 
in its infancy.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
The study of academic labor markets by economists has encompassed many more 
topics than I have touched on today. For example, because faculty salary data are often 
public information and measures of productivity can sometimes be developed, labor 
economists have estimated how faculty productivity varies with age, whether faculty 
salaries are tied to productivity and the extent that gender and racial/ethnic differences in 
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faculty salaries and promotion probabilities exist.38 We have investigated whether 
universities have monopsony power in the market for senior professors, built models to 
provide explanations for the tenure system and estimated whether there are compensating 
wage differentials for low tenure probabilities.39 We have studied how the end of 
mandatory retirement has influenced faculty retirement behavior and estimated the 
effectiveness of retirement incentive programs for faculty.40 We have estimated the 
impact of unions on faculty salaries and working conditions, as well as on college and 
university staff members’ salaries and tried to infer the values of university trustees from 
studying the compensation changes of university presidents.41In spite of all of these 
contributions, research on academic labor markets and, more generally, the economics of 
higher education, is still at an early stage. I hope that this paper will encourage more 
economists to study these issues. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38  Sharon Oster and Daniel Hamermesh (1998), Daniel Hamermesh, George Johnson and Burton Weisbrod 
(1982), James Monks and Michael Robinson (2000) and Alison Booth, Jeff Frank and David Blackaby 
(2001) 
39 Michael S. McPherson and Morton O. Schapiro (1999), Aloysius Siow (1998) and Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 
Michael W. Matier and David M. Fontenella (2000) 
40 Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (2001), Robert L. Clark, Linda S. Ghent and Junita Krebs (2001) 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Michael W. Matier and David Fontenella (2001) and John Pencavel (2001) 
41 Daniel Rees (1993, 1995), Debra Barbezat (1989), Daniel B. Klaff and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (2002) and 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, John Cheslock and Julia Epifantseva (2001) 
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Figure 1
R1 Full Professor Variance of Log Salary
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Figure 2
R1 Associate Professor Variance of Log Salary
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Figure 3
R1 Assistant Professor Variance of Log Salary
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Year
20
01
$ 
- s
qu
ar
ed
Private (n=17)
Public (n=33)
Figure 4
Liberal Arts Colleges Variance of Log Salary
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Figure 5
Continuation Rate of Associate Professors at Private and Public Universities 
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                                                      Table 1 
 
Hypothetical Comparison of Cornell’s and Princeton’s Spending Per 
                Student and Average Professor Salary Levels* 
 
                                                                    
                                                           Cornell        Princeton    Ratio(P/C) 
1990-91                               
(1) July 1 Endowment/Student            51,000         390,000 
(2) 5% of July 1 Endow/Stud.               2,550           19,500         
(3) Tuition                                             15,164           15,440 
(4) Spending Per Student ((2)+(3))     17,714           34,940       1.97 
(5) Average Professor Salary              71,500           82,400       1.15 
 
2000-01 
(1) July 1 Endowment Per Student    186,000     1,323,000 
(2) 5% of July 1 Endow/Stud                 9,300           66,150 
(3) Tuition                                              24,852           25.430 
(4) Spending Per Student ((2)+(3))      34,152           91,580      2.68 
(5) Average Professor Salary             103,000         125,700      1.22 
 
Growth Rates Over The Decade                 
Endowment                                            265%             239% 
Tuition                                                      64%              65% 
Spending Per Student                              93%             162% 
 
* These comparisons are hypothetical because they assume that the 
institutions each spent 5% of the July 1 value of their endowments in 
each year and the comparisons ignore all sources of spending other than 
endowment and tuition income.  
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Figure 6
Indirect Cost Recovery Rates at 
All Research and Doctoral Institutions: 228 Schools
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Indirect Cost Recovery Rates at 
All Research and Doctoral Institutions
 228 Schools by Institutional Control
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